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The Idealist Practice of Reflection:
Typologies, Techniques and Ideologies for
Design Researchers.

Design theory over the last few decades has been an attempt to find the middle
ground between ‘that about which one can say nothing’ (craft or creativity) and ‘that
which is reduced to nothing by saying too much’ (a scientific or systematic method).
Donald Schön’s now near canonical account of ‘reflective practice’ not only pointed
to a level of articulation that found something to say about designing without
concealing or constraining it; but, perhaps more significantly, what Schön had to say
about designing – that there is a reflection reflex at the heart of its practice –
established a bridge between the situated flow of designing and accounts of
design judgements.

Cameron Tonkinwise
University of Technology
Sydney

The polemical context in which Schön was writing is often forgotten: as the last of the
modern vocations (eg management, health care beyond medicine, planning and
design, teacher training) were incorporated into the project of the university, Schön
and his collaborators were attempting to resist the technocratic rationalism that was
invalidly shoring up and dangerously misdirecting professional expertise. In this
context, the beauty of Schön’s account is that it puts a research method (dialectical
hermeneutics) at the heart of the design process. With only a shift in emphasis (from
outcome to process), designing is researching, with a clear role in the postmodern
university.
However, how minor is this move necessary for the practice of design to become the
research of design? How short is this bridge between a practical reflex and the
discipline of reflection?
This paper explores the notion of reflection in order to reveal how complex the
transition from process to analysis is. Through a close reading of Schön’s texts – and
not only his texts on Reflective Practitioners, but also his crucial collaborations with
Chris Argyris on professional effectiveness through double-loop learning – it critically
reviews Schön’s use of the term ‘reflection’, locating it within the concept’s wider
intellectual history.
Two contrasting responses to the way ideas about ‘reflective practice’ are taken for
granted are then set out.
Firstly, since reflection in any deliberate and sustained manner is not natural or
habitual, the paper summarises the diverse range of techniques that Schön insists
are required for designing’s reflectiveness to attain the epistemological requirements
of developing new knowledge.
Secondly, as assumed ideas invariably conceal ideologies, the social and
metaphysical ‘power plays’ at work in promotions of ‘reflective practice’ are
interrogated. The paper concludes that a romantic idealism – where certain
techniques allows wholes to exceed the sum of their parts – continues to mythicise
design, research and design research. For this, the paper draws on some
poststructural theory.
This paper is then a report of theoretical research into the concept of reflective
practice that aims to critique and redirect design research making use of reflective
practice processes and literature.
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THE IDEALIST PRACTICE OF REFLECTION:
TYPOLOGIES, TECHNIQUES, AND IDEOLOGIES
FOR DESIGN RESEARCH
INTRODUCTION
The following will attempt clarify and complexify the notion of reflective practice.
Ironically, invocations of reflective practice are often themselves not at all
reflective of the consequences associated with where this practice comes from.
(Ecclestone 1996) Ignorance of the genealogy of reflective practice risks the
practice of reflective practice being insufficiently reflective. Awareness of that
geneaology opens reflective practice to more effective techniques that are
otherwise missed, whilst also limiting claims about the effectivity of reflective
practice more generally.
To put this another way, Donald Schon’s notion of reflective practice is appealing
because of its pragmatism. Developed from American pragmatist philosophies,
John Dewey in particular, with the specific aim of capturing the pragmatism of
design as a creative problem-solving expertise, reflective practice, as reflectionin-action, happens in and as the everyday of designing. For this reason, there is
a danger of assuming that by merely being a designer one is always already a
reflective practitioner, without having to act any differently. This is not just a
misreading of Schon, but also a misreading of pragmatism, which I hope to show
always has a romantic heart, by which I mean an element of affectively formative
willing – i.e., romanticism in the philosophic sense.1 Reflective practices are how
designers design, but they must also be designed, and, according to the
philosophies grounding the notion of reflection, designed in ways that are more
ambitious than the everyday pragmatics of designing.

SCHON’S POPULARITY IN RELATION TO THE INSTITUTIONALISATION OF
DESIGN TODAY
A history of the institution of design might be:

1



Industrialisation, seeking more efficient mass production, divides the labour of
craft, separating the planning of what is to be made from the process of its
physical making (Jones 1979)



There is then the attempt to institutionalise the resulting profession of design and
ensure its replicability by extracting teachable principles and methods from the
embodied and communal practice (Alexander 1968)



However, the demand for predictability in outcomes leads to further attempts not
only to abstract the design process, but now to alter it, rationalising it into a
universalisable method (Simon 1976)

I am following the (anti)definition of Clemens (2003).



At this points, the arational aspects of this expertise assert themselves against the
‘design methods’ movement and attempts are made to recover the artful aspects
of designing and foster these through recrafted educational environments and
processes (Jones 1986)



In this context, design believes that it has the unique identity to begin to become
a discipline with its own higher degrees and research methods rather than just one
amongst other professions (Ohio PhD Design, Common Ground, Research by
Design)

As design tries to assume its own position within the postmodern multiversity — that is, a
university that is no longer turned (versus) toward the one thing (unus), be that god,
reason, national culture, technology, or excellence (Readings 1996) — one of the most
frequently invoked authorities is Donald Schön. Why is this?
On the one hand, it is because Schön is one of first non-designers — a philosopher by
training with experience in management consultancy in the area of technology innovation
who spent most of his academic life in a planning department (Waks 2001:37-8)— to
access and promote what is designerly about design. Schön, employing what would now
be called a sort of grounded theory or participatory ethnographic research process,
developed through his work with Chris Agyris (see Agyris, 1980), learned about
designing when he was “asked to join a study of architectural education.” (Schon 1987:
xi) It was on this “intellectual journey” that he “did not anticipate” (xi) that Schön
discovered the idea that designing was a process of ‘problem-setting’ in ‘conversation
with a situation’ best characterised as a type of ‘reflection-in-action.’ (31, 42) Schön’s
description is therefore particularly insightful for designers because it was learned from
and through designing.
Schon’s tale of how he researched design is perhaps ‘prediction after the fact.’ Schön’s
lifelong polemic, sustained after his studies of design, but also pre-dating them, was
resisting ‘technical rationality’ because of the way it constrained the effectivity of
professional expertise at a time when adeptness at negotiating change was urgently
required — see for example, Beyond the Stable State (1973). Schön was looking for
strong examples of non-scientistic ways of responding to what he perceived as increasing
turmoil. Design fitted this brief, because it contained “the seeds of an earlier view of
professional knowledge” (1987: 43), that is, more tacit, artful, case-by-case ways of
proceeding. If Schon is guilty of a sort of ‘leading questioning’ designers tend not to see
this as invalidating Schön’s account, but enhancing its accuracy. Precisely because Schön
was at pains to prevent the imposition of positivism onto design, he was more able to hear
what lay at the heart of designing. Because the notion of reflective practice was designed
for and from design, Schön is celebrated for articulating the very act of designing. Where
so many accounts of design as a method describe only what has recently be called preand post-design,2 leaving as a black box a stage called something like ‘creative problemsolving’, ‘divergent thinking’, ‘synthesis’, ‘incubation’, Schön’s account delivers to
designer’s ‘the surprise of self-recognition’ (Nelson & Stolterman, 20033) with regard to

These terms and these accounts of design methods missing designing proper, I take
from recent discussions on the PhD-Design e-discussion list throughout April.
3 Nelson & Stolterman do not refer to Schon. Their phrase 'surprise of self-recognition'
is their useful characterisation of the 'being-in-service' relation essential to designing.
2

what lies at the heart of the act of designing, the generation of ideas that respond to
situations in desired ways.

DESIGN AS EXEMPLAR
On the other hand however, there is much more to Schön’s project that makes it
appealing to design at this moment in its institutional history (perhaps moreso than when
Schön first wrote about design). In many ways, Schön seems to be too good to be true,
accomplishing with the one concept, reflective practice, not just an accurate description
of designing, but one that:
1. finds in the very practice of design a distinctive research method and an
educational strategy. Because design as a reflective practice involves explicating
as knowledge what otherwise remains at the level of knowing (Schon, 1983: 59),
because that knowing-in-action involves reframing situations as novel extensions
of a repertoire of solvable problems (309, 315), and because what results is
sharable amongst a community of practice (Schon, 1987: 32-6), “when someone
reflects-in-action, [s/]he becomes a researcher.” (1983: 68) And because that
research is into and for the betterment of ones practice, s/he also becomes a
(self)teacher. (1983: 299) Schön’s account of design therefore “can bridge the
worlds of university and practice,” (1987: 305) by finding research practices and
learning tactics at the core of designing itself, avoiding the need for designers to
borrow methodologies and pedagogies from other academic fields. The notion of
reflective practice therefore makes designing itself a method of research and
education. In other words, Schön’s account can be read as demonstrating that the
profession of design is already a discipline. By doing what they do naturally,
designers are already researching and teaching. All previous attempts to abstract
or rationalise design are utterly refused by the fact there is, in Schön’s notion of
reflective practice, no distance between the pragmatics of designing and the
academics of researching and teaching.
2. not only articulates what is unique to design, but characterises design as the
model for all professions and, because also for all research and education, all
disciplines. All “professional practitioners are also makers,” of “artefacts”, if
these are understood generally, as products, but also “arguments, agreements…
plans, policies… and systems;” but more importantly of “problems and …
situations.” (1987: 42) “As makers of artefacts, all practitioners are design
professionals” (1987: 43) and so designerly “artistry [is] prototypical of
reflection-in-action in other professions… designing, broadly conceived, is the
process fundamental to the exercise of artistry in all professions.” (41) The notion
of reflective practice therefore elevates design to a paradigm. Schön not only
preserves what is particular to the practice of design and so grants it its own
rightful place in the university, but simultaneously makes design a new unus
toward which all should versus.
No wonder then that Schön is lauded by designers.

THE SWAMP OF REFLEXIVE REFLECTIONS

Two things should haunt designers too easily enamoured with Schön. The first is that to a
certain extent, because of 1) above, designers appear to almost automatically gain access
into our institutions of higher learning and research. If designers need do nothing to enter
the university, if designers need only do what they ordinarily do, then perhaps the
university offers nothing more for designers, in which case why enrol? The second is that,
because of 2) above, designers are not alone in their affection for or identification with
Schön. They are in fact the last in a line of rivals — ahead of them are planners,
educators, social workers, nurses, and managers (each of which has moved beyond
enamourment through critique to modification). So if design is only one of many
professional disciplines with reflective practice at their centre, does not reflective practice
risk being everything and nothing?
Another version of these side-effects from the Schönian panacea is that reflective practice
becomes uncannily self-reflexive:
•

reflective practice < > designing
design is not just a model reflective practice, but reflective practice is itself a
kind of designing, a process of reframing, problem-finding and –setting, and
making (effective reflections); it is something that needs be done not just like
a designer ("thinking like a …" [1987: 39])but explicitly designed; it involves
designing reflections into practices, or what Schon calls making "seeing as"
into "on the spot experiments" (1983: 141)

•

designing < > learning
reflective practice is not just how you design, but how you learn to design –
which is why Schon's examples of designing can be the designing that takes
place in educational settings or 'virtual worlds' (1987: 75) – and how you
professionally develop your designing after learning how to design (1983:
324); because designing is a reflective practice, you learn to design by
designing and by designing you learn to design better – "students must learn
[reflective imitation] in the very same process by which they try to learn the
process of designing – learning to engage in reflective imitation as they learn
designing through reflective imitation" (1985, 75); or to put it another way,
since education is itself one of those professions that should be modelling
itself on designerly reflective practice, how you learn is itself a process of
designing — a form of making (onself) through problem-based reframing
(1987: 290)

•

learning < > reflective practice
reflective practice is inherent to the process of designing as a type of tacit
know-how; however, to mobilise this know-how for learning – and in
particular to retrieve it from technical routines or defensive rationalisations,
designers must make reflective practice an explicit technique through
reflective practice – "[since] the description of one's own knowing-in-actin is
itself a skill… designers can learn to make better descriptions [i.e., reflections]
of designing… by continued reflection on their own skilful performances [of
reflection-in-action" (1987: 160) – and then make a habit through reflective
practice (1983: 281-2)

Schön does not avoid or deny these risks of messy, indeterminate, dilemmas: quite the
opposite. In many ways, Educating the Reflective Practitioner is a confrontation with the

unresolved reflexivity of The Reflective Practioner. The brief that Schon gives himself –
"What kind of professional education is appropriate to an epistemology of practice based
on reflection-in-action?" (1987: xii) – could be recast as: "How to enter this hermeneutic
circle?" Schon's willingness to work through these confusions is why, I would like to
suggest, they are defining moments for understanding the practice of reflective practice.
This is to be expected given that these are the moments when Schön, ‘surprised’ (1987:
28) by his own process ‘talking back’ to him, is forced to pause, reflect and reframe
‘reflective practice.’

THE AUTHENTIC CRITICAL PRAXIS OF REFLECTION
Schön's way of pulling himself out of these regressive swamps is a ladder. Schön spaces
out the reflexivity of reflection with the old philosophical trick of saying that there is
reflection, and then there is ‘Reflection’:
4 Reflection on reflection on description of designing
3 Reflection on description of designing
2 Description of designing
1 Designing (1987: 115)

The bottom rung is unreflective reflection-in-action. The second rung is a think-aloud.
The third is questioning the meaning or appropriateness of those articulations. And the
final level is to have formulated responses to those questions.
It is worth noting that all levels involve deliberate effort and to this extent are to
differentiated from conventional practice. It is not as though things are easier at the
bottom of the ladder. Developing descriptions of designing is a particular skill that John
Mason has usefully characterised as The Discipline of Noticing (2002), something that is
only possible at Level 2 if one is in the difficult-to-maintain habit of marking moments in
Level 1 for later remarking.
Obversely, and following Alan Bleakley’s insights (1999), the uppermost Level 4 is not
an ascension into the heavenly theoria of the vita contemplativa, but precisely a return to
the phronesis of the vita activa. Only this last is truly ‘Reflective’, not in having plumbed
the depths of an interiority, but in having extracted (2) from a reflex (1) reflections (3)
that can be bent back (re-flectere: Bleakly, 1999: 320 citing Hillman) into those no longer
reflex actions (4).
Importantly, particularly for designers who tend to focus only on Schön’s two ‘reflective
practitioner’ books, ignoring his earlier work with Chris Agyris, the top rung is also not
mere identificatory self-recognition, but recognition of one's own self-misrecognition that
leads to an identity change. Schön notes at the end of Educating the Reflective
Practitioner that vicious circling in reflective practice is a symptom of Model I defensive,
self-justifying behaviour, as opposed to the virtuous spiralling of Model II's open, doubleloop learning (1987: 301-2). This means that lower order unreflective reflecting is
narcissistic, in the double sense of only ever telling you what you know already
(“equilibrium state of death” [1987: 308]) whilst also being wholly illusionary (“a
precious island cut off” [1987:312]). Higher order deflective reflecting puts you outside
of yourself, able to observe your theories-in-use (as opposed to the self-fulfilling
prophecies you espouse), and thereby become different (1987: 290).

At this point, it becomes apparent that Schön’s ladder could, and perhaps should,4 be
extended (he himself adds a further rung later: reflection on the interpersonal aspects of
coach-student relations [1987: 139]) through alienation from false consciousness to
existential phenomenology in which case, Schön’s ladder might be the following:5
Name

Who and When

How

Nature

Exponents

Reflection-inAction

What professionals do
when faced with illstructured problems

Reframing,
drawing on
precedent

Near tacit, part
of the designing

Schön,
Polanyi

Noticing

Mechanisms that
professionals use to
remind them to
remember moments in
the flow of practice

heuristics,
checklists,
exercises, selfquestions,

Interruptions

Mason

Reflective
Development

Novices becoming
proficient

Noticing patterns,
taking risks

Inherent
capacity for skill
acquisition

Dreyfus, Eraut

Reflective
Learning

How everybody turns
experiences into
actionable beliefs

Concept building,
pattern
recognition

Requires effort
but part of
learning (to
learn)

Dewey, Kolb

Reflection-onAction

How professionals
develop

Debriefing,
Knowledge
management

Making the tacit
explicit

Schön

ReflectionthroughAction /
Action
Research

Making professional
development or
knowledge from
experience methodical

Inductive theory
building,
Deductive
hypothesis
extrapolating,
Abductive testing

Explicit
research method

Expert
Reflection

Developing expert
styles

Noticing
anomalies, setting
new challenges

Habits, Styles

Dreyfus,
Czichsentmiha
lyi

Schon is often criticised for ignoring questions of power. Adaptations of Schon to the
domain of adult learning most often negotiate this issue (eg Boud, Keogh & Walker,
1988).
5 The following also aims to take into account Mezirow's 'ladder' for critical reflexivity:
reflectivity – awareness of something; affective reflectivity – awareness of feelings about
something; discriminant reflectivity – awareness of beliefs of efficacy behind something;
judgemental reflectivity – awareness of value judgements involved in something;
conceptual reflectivity – critiquing one's awarenesses; psychic reflectivity – critiquing
one's judgements; theoretical reflectivity – locating one's critiques in wider cultural
contexts (Mezirow 1981)
4

Double-Loop
Learning

Professionals
restructuring
interpersonal work
relations

Double
columning,
Sharing,
Unbinding

Explicit
techniques

Agyris, Freud

Reflexive
Sociology

Individuals becoming
aware of the power
relations structuring
their actions

Reading theory,
interpreting
symptoms

Praxis

Marx, Giroux,
Bourdieu

Reflective
Thinking

Philosophers revealing
epistemologies and
ontologies

Phenomenological
hermeneutics

Abstract but not
necessarily
formal process

Descartes,
Kant, Husserl

Speculative
Thinking

Philosophers
developing ontologies

Poetry

Strategy

Hegel,
Schlegel,
Schiller,
Nietzsche

This more politicised account of reflective practice however raises questions that cannot
be pursued here, about the extent to which reflective practice is form of Foucauldian selfdisciplining (Usher & Edwards: 1994), one that concurs with, on the one hand, the use of
reflection for therapeutic self-fashioning (eg the vogue popularising the Ancients for
Philosophy as a Way of Life)6 and on the other an unquestioned drive for more efficient
performativity (eg Lyotard 1983: 62).
REFLECTION AND THE TIME OF THE OTHER
Schon's ladder is however only a map of what the different types of reflection must be for
them not to collapse into the mess that blurs design, reflective practice and learning. How
to climb the ladder is yet to be explained.
I have digressed into the politicisation of Schon's ladder, because what is crucial to
motivating and sustaining the ascent is – sociality. That sharing initiates reflections and
that reflections must be shared to become 'Reflections' is strangely easy to miss, firstly
because reflection strikes us (before reflection about this) as the internal processes of
isolated individuals, but secondly, because Schon almost takes this aspect of reflection for
granted. The inherent sociality of reflection ("reciprocal reflection-in-action" [1987: xii])
is why Schön never questions that all his case studies are critical dialogues about shared
practices rather than, for example, professionals' private process diaries or think aloud
protocols. For Schon, what moves students up the ladder is having to externalise
reflective practices: "Free of the need to make our ideas explicit to someone else, we are
less likely to make them explicit to our selves." (1987: 300) Reflection requires a mirror;
thus it is only through the process of exposing oneself to an other that reflection actually
happens. In this context, it must be remembered that Schon's primary pragmatic brief for

This is unfair to Pierre Hadot, whose work is too scholarly to be classed with the
confessional day-time television of Rawston Saul et al.
6

his research is the reform of institutions from organizations that socialize professionals
out of reflection – "self-reinforcing system of knowing in practice… that makes itself
immune to reflection" (1983: 282) - into ones that encourage reflection by "mak[ing] a
place for attention to conflicting values and purposes." (1983: 338)
Another aspect to the process of climbing the ladder is that it is a process, something that
takes time. Again, this is something that risks being taken for granted. To put it the other
way around, if reflex becomes reflection becomes 'Reflection' over time, almost in the
mould of organic growth, then one cannot leap straight to 'Reflection'. There are no
techniques for performing Level 3 or 4 without having moved through Level 2. The
process must proceed sequentially, or in Schon's terms, rigorously, that is, opening itself
to all resistances, lest it stall in 'self-fulfilling prophecy.' (1987: 74)
Therefore one ascends the ladder over time through interactions with critical others.
Significantly, this is a highly developmental and progressivist account of reflective
practice, with a teleology toward emancipation and freedom, which can itself be
criticised, returning us to Foucault (Bleakley, 1999)

THE LEARNERS' PARADOX
Something is still missing though. The process might take time, others may direct or
assist, and the result might be higher order, more critically praxical reflections that better
enable change, but something else is required to bring these elements into coherent
relations. If there is not something else, then reflective practice recedes back into exactly
the type of technique that Schon's whole project aims to supplant. Something is needed
that will explain how years of practicing a technique can eventually become
improvisatory virtuosity.
Or to put it more pragmatically: someone might be forcing or helping you to do reflective
practice, perhaps by giving you a timeframe for your movements, but there is still the task
of moving. The set of outcomes toward which you should be moving (the ladder) will not
move you because what is codified there are abstractions of tacit knowings that you are
yet to experience in ways that move them into reflectivity.7
This is of course, Meno's paradox:
“ “But how will look for something when you don’t in the least know what it is? … To put
it another way, even if you come right up against it, how will you know that what you have
found is the thing you didn't know?" [Plato, 1956: 128] Like Meno, the design student
knows the she needs to look for something but does not know what that something is. She
seeks to learn it, moreover, in the sense of coming to know it in action. Yet at the
beginning, she can neither do it nor recognize it when she sees it. Hence she is caught in
self-contradiction.” (Schon 1987: 83)
"It is true that students do often come to recognize and appreciate the qualities of competent
designing, which they then try to produce… [However,] In our effort to account for this

This is Lucy Suchman's critique of plans and their inability to facilitate situated
actions. (Suchman 1992)
7

way of learning, we cannot avoid the problem of explaining how, in the first place, they
come to recognize good designing when they see it." (Schon 1987: 88)

Since, designing is in essence a learning by reflective practice, substituting 'reflection',
'reflecting' and 'reflective practitioner' for design, designing and designer or learning and
knowing in these quotations is not merely analogical. Schon is here admitting that he
must still find a way of explaining the effectivity of reflection.
A negotiation of Meno's paradox forms the centre of Educating the Reflective
Practitioner – i.e., the whole of Part 2 with its chapters on the “Paradoxes and
Predicaments of Learning to Design.” (Chapter 4) Schön, following his own model of
reflective practice, reframes his reflexive dilemma by ‘seeing [it] as’ a previous situation
drawn from the problem repertoire (of philosophy). So what is the outcome?
Plato's solution was the notion of anamnesis, later to become the doctrine of Ideal forms:
everyone is always already within the Truth and so has the Truth within. Schon follows
his Platonic model but, as a pragmatist, in a non-metaphysical way, by suggesting that the
movement of reflection involves imitation. As Schon makes clear however, imitation is
no simple answer. "The obviousness of imitation dissolves, however, when we examine it
more closely." (1987 108) On reflection, "imitation presents itself as a process of
selective construction," (108) that is, a "reconstruction" of what one selects to perceive in
who or what is to be imitated. Schon likes this account because it means that "imitative
reconstruction of an observed action is a kind of problem-solving", by which he means a
series of experiments aiming at "successive differentiations." (109) However, the
relativism of this constructivist version of imitation continues haunt his instrumental
reading, merely pushing the mis-en-abyme further back (from imitation to perception):
"The features of the performance to be reproduced are not given with the demonstration.
The baby [or designer or professional or learner in general] selects and integrates in its own
performance what it takes to be essential in the things it sees the mother do. Or perhaps we
ought to say, there is already in its perception of its mother's [or teacher's or coach's] action
a construction of the essential and inessential things, which it then translates into its
performance." (108)

If the selection of what to imitate lies with the imitator, this means that when "I put
myself into a new situation of action and from its vantage point get a new view of and
feeling for the performance I am trying to imitate," (111) there is no way of assuring that
what is 'new' correlates in any way with 'its vantage point.' When I hear the situation talkback, are these not voices in my head, me talking to myself without my remembering that
it is me talking?
This continued lack of ground for accounting for reflective learning is why the next
chapter concerns “How the Teaching and Learning Process can go Wrong.” (Chapter 6)
Essentially there are two dangers: imitating the wrong thing, which means doing one's
own thing ("Stance" binds or refusing to imitate [118]), or imitating the right thing, which
means not making what one is doing one's own ("overlearning" or "closed-system
vocabulary" [155]). From coach's point of view, both goings wrong are prevented by
issuing a oxymoronic command: imitate me while not imitating me.
However, this is not, I believe, yet another moment in which Schon finds himself mired
again in the reflective swamp. How this command does make sense and is not merely

paradoxical, points to what might break the dilemma by spacing the reflexivity of
reflectivity with something like a foundation.

THE MIMETOLOGY OF REFLECTION
To understand this possibility, it is necessary to acknowledge that these problems with
mimesis have a long pedigree. As Heidegger notes, when discussing Plato in relation to
Nietzsche's aesthetics, mimesis originally meant production rather than reproduction. It
was a particular moment in history of metaphysics when philosophers attempted to
impose a logic on this over-productive dehiscience and constrain it to controllable forms
of cloning. As Derrida and others have noted, this mimetology was not only not
successful, but in fact hypocritically underwrote the history of that 'civilization.'8 In other
words, the power of logic always depends upon having learned logic, and that learning is
not logical, but mimetic in the old alogical sense.
To put this in context, Plato was an educator in Ancient greek tradition of paideia. If the
stated content of the dialogue with Meno does not resolve the paradox, the process of
being in dialogue with Plato resolves the paradox in practice. For, this type of education
is not merely informative but formative. It is a very precisely, a type of designing that
combines rational functionality (being a citizen) with style (being an ethical character). It
is a wholistic form of learning and a formative learning of the whole.
In a move that itself is exemplary of this mimetological fashion, German romanticism9
attempts not to imitate the Ancient Greeks, but (re)produce for itself the model that the
the modern Germans assumed the Ancient Greeks to be following, with its notion of
Bildung or cultural formation.10 In turn, Bildung is precisely the process of reflectively
journeying through unique cases, building a tacit sense of what unites all these at an
inexplicable level of the ideal. (Gadamer 1989 [1960]: 10-17)
The similarity – or I would argue, the sameness – with Schon should be apparent. Every
time Schon finds himself declaring that design, or any professional expertise since what is
at stake is reflective practice, is something learnable but not teachable (see 1987: 152167), Schon is saying that reflective practice is a type of Bildung. This is not to be
unexpected given that Schon's stated project – retrieving artistry from technical
rationality via reflection in the context of the modern university – is a concise definition
of the ambitions of the Jena romantics in reaction to Kant, from Schlegel and Schiller to
Kleist and Humboldt.

Whilst the term mimetology was coined by Jacques Derrida in Dissemination, I am
following Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's use of the term in Typography: Mimesis,
Philosophy, Politics.
9 Romanticism means replicating the Roman classics. However, the difference between
English and German romanticism is often captured in the fact that the latter viewed the
Roman classics as poor imitations of the inimitable Greeks, and perceived itself to be the
heir chosen to recover the truth of the Greeks concealed by Rome's superficial copies.
10 This is Lacoue-Labarthe's claim in relation to Nietzsche's revival of the Jena
romantics (1990).
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Consequently, all that Schon describes and promotes, despite its pragmatism, is a
furthering of this romanticism. In this case, what motivates reflection, what makes
reflection into 'Reflection', is being romantic. This means willing, willingly forming and
formatively willing, in affective ways, what one is (becoming). Reflection is not the
discovery of a model within or the imitation of a model without, but, becoming-a-model
by forcefully intending to be exemplary.
The closest Schon comes to declaring this romanticism is when he turns to the Romantic
poet Coleridge for the key to controlling the productive mimesis of reflective learning,
namely "willing suspension of disbelief." (1987: 94) Schon at first gives the
pragmatically rational reading of this double negative: it does not mean "to will 'belief'"
but merely to suspend disbelief until one "has access to the information on which to base
a good decision." (94) However, Schon immediately acknowledges the more romantic
reading: "in order to get that information, [one] must commit to the enterprise that yields
the experience." (94) It is crucial to see through Coleridge's classically Romantic gesture
with Schon. The double negative allows an irrational sensibility to hide within a type of
sensible reasonableness. But in the end what matters for the process to work is not the
waiting but the willing. And Schon concurs repeatedly: the suspension of disbelief is not
an autonomous objectivity, but a deliberate surrendering (95); it is not passively receiving
instruction but a "willingness to try to enter into [the coach's] way of seeing things and
[an] active search for [the coach's] meanings… [a] self-education;" (125); "You must be
willing, therefore, to have these experiencesand the relation is not a neutral contract but
an emotionally indebting investment (167) even to the point of frustrating Schon's
supposedly non-technically rational idea of 'reflective practice':
"Students hold unrealistically high expectations for their performance. Once they become
aware of their errors, they believe they should be able to produce complete and perfect
interventions [into problem situations]. They see error as failure, and when they repeat their
errors, they experience a blow to self-esteem. They do not as yet have the idea of a learning
process in which imperfect actions are continually modified through reflection-in-action."
(291)11

It is at this point that the turning-point question arises, the one that makes inflects
reflection into 'Reflection': "Do [the students] really want to learn this, if this is what it
entails?" (291) Only by affirming this question, with willed actions can one own one's
reflections and become what they model. (1985: 75)

DESIGNING REFLECTIONS
Pragmatically, this means that the reflections of reflective practice must be designed to be
educational research.12 They need to be intentionally formed into situation changing
actions. They need to formed, figured into relational diagrams, and/or schematised into
moving narratives. They are motivated by being emotional, effective by being affective.

I cannot go into this, but the fact that imperfection can be a model of perfection is a
classically romantic gesture – think of the ruin – and the archetypal form of romantic
philosophy – the fragment. See Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy (1988 [1978]).
12 This conclusion is similar to that of Doloughan (2002) plus philosophical
theorisation.
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This conclusion is not another cycling round the identity of design, reflection, research
and learning, because design here is not to be understood pragmatically, as problemsolving, but romantically, as forming. If there is a problem to be solved by reflection, it
will only be solved if the problem is so strongly felt as a problem that it empowers the
reflection.
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